SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
8 references·6 citing·42 second hop
Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models (1992)Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Mo…Value of communication in agencies (1989)Value of communication in age…The theory of contracts (1987)The theory of contractsCompetition for Agency Contracts (1987)Competition for Agency Contra…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)A complete solution to a clas…Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies (1979)Straightforward Individual In…Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation (1927)A Contribution to the Theory …Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (2022)Simple contracts with adverse…Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information (2021)Salesforce Compensation and T…THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS* (2005)THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SE…Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm (1998)Regulation of a Risk Averse F…Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement (1994)Guilty until Proven Innocent-…Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents (1989)Adverse selection and moral h…The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control (1988)The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring (1997)Regulating Pollution with Endogenous Monitoring (2002)Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy (2003)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (1999)Corporate tax evasion with agency costs (2004)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions (1988)Financial Systems in Northern Thai Villages (1995)O rganizational D iseconomies of scale (1995)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Optimal Contracts for Teams (1991)Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation (1996)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Equity, envy, and efficiency (1974)Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. (1975)THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT PART I (1985)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)The Socialist System (1992)Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence (1997)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. (1987)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2009)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters (2012)Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1927A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation2,918 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1987The theory of contracts1,330 cited
  • 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm648 cited
  • 1979Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies321 cited
  • 1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
  • 1989Value of communication in agencies124 cited

Cited by

  • 1994Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement61 cited
  • 1998Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm56 cited
  • 1989Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents50 cited
  • 2022Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard43 cited
  • 2005THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*30 cited
  • 2021Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information15 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work