Compensation and Top Management Turnover

Hamid Mehran · David Yermack

18 citations0/0 files storedSSRN Electronic Journal

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Human Resource and Talent Management

Abstract

An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by which their compensation is higher than expected. We also find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of stock option compensation in relation to cash pay. The results, which are significant across the entire sample of CEOs, appear stronger for subsamples of CEO departures likely to have been voluntary.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 18 citations exist upstream.

Cited by

2007The effect of stock option grants on voluntary employee turnover 2009CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns 2001Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for CEO Talent

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.