Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts

Andrew J. Oswald

73 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Labor Law and Work Dynamics Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

The paper provides evidence to show that many U.S. labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision. A model of an optional contract under asymmetric information, with no private unemployment insurance, is presented. Underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

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1974Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand 1976Optimal tax theory 1976A neo-classical theory of keynesian unemployment 1983Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction 1978Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand 1980The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument 1981Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment 1983Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts

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1998Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance 2001Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State 2005The Macroeconomics of Unemployment

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