Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does It Make?

Abstract

A fuller discussion of the differences between those two approaches regarding the practical implementation of transparency and other issues appears in the concluding section of Cukierman (2001).See also de Haan and Eijffinger (2000) for an appraisal of the Buiter-Issing interchange.2 Some other countries with explicit inflation targeting systems are New Zealand, Canada, Finland, Australia, and Spain.In almost all cases the final formal authority to set the target resides with government.By contrast, in the case of the BB and the ECB, the target is chosen by the CB.

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