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Procurement in Supply Chains When the End-Product Exhibits the 'Weakest Link' Property
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References

  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 2018PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT5,504 cited
  • 1995The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm2,892 cited
  • 2003Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts2,737 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 2020A Course in Microeconomic Theory1,592 cited
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  • 1982Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry1,112 cited
  • 1972Economic theory of teams1,071 cited
  • 2009Production, information costs, and economic organization969 cited
  • 1999The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice881 cited
  • 1992Juran on Quality by Design: The New Steps for Planning Quality into Goods and Services609 cited
  • 1982Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation478 cited
  • 1991Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations464 cited
  • 1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

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  • 2006Coordination and Incentive Contracts in Project Management Under Asymmetric Information36 cited
  • 2023Should a powerful manufacturer collaborate with a risky supplier? Pre-recall vs. post-recall strategies in product harm crisis management21 cited