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Reduction of mind
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  • 2010Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?172 cited
  • 2009Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness163 cited
  • 2009There Are No Phenomenal Concepts145 cited
  • 2013A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box142 cited
  • 1999A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience123 cited
  • 2003Concepts and Conceptual Analysis101 cited
  • 2005Folk Psychology as a Model101 cited
  • 2002The Computational Theory of Mind98 cited
  • 2010A PosterioriPhysicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong97 cited
  • 2008Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?93 cited
  • 1994The Components of Content93 cited
  • 2008Triviality arguments against functionalism92 cited
  • 2014The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity84 cited
  • 2013The Role of Naturalness in Lewis's Theory of Meaning79 cited
  • 2015Real Acquaintance and Physicalism79 cited
  • 2008Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics

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73 cited