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Bank Herding and Incentive Systems as Catalysts for the Financial Crisis
16 references·1 citing·35 second hop
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References

  • 1968The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.46,361 cited
  • 2004The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields25,805 cited
  • 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*19,431 cited
  • 2017A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance18,122 cited
  • 1998Law and Finance17,902 cited
  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 2009Building theories from case study research11,299 cited
  • 1983Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity9,689 cited
  • 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]6,743 cited

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  • 1937The General Theory of Employment5,168 cited
  • 2005Handbook of Economic Growth4,446 cited
  • 2004Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence3,752 cited
  • 1972Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing3,097 cited
  • 1979Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises2,838 cited
  • 1988Herd Behavior and Investment2,815 cited
  • 1972Victims of Groupthink2,379 cited
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    • 2020Emotional finance: determinants of phantasy18 cited