Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state‐given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object‐given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object‐given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.

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