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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons
13 references·3 citing·36 second hop
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons (2012)Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not…Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values (2018)Exploring Practical Philosoph…Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason (2012)Transmission and the Wrong Ki…Believing For a Reason (2011)Believing For a ReasonThe Domain of Reasons (2010)The Domain of ReasonsThe Ontology of Epistemic Reasons (2009)The Ontology of Epistemic Rea…The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem (2008)The possibility of pragmatic …Knowing the Answer (2007)Knowing the AnswerBrentano and the Buck-Passers (2007)Brentano and the Buck-PassersA New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)A New Argument for Evidential…Why Be Rational? (2005)Why Be Rational?The Wrong Kind of Reason (2005)The Wrong Kind of ReasonBuck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons (2004)Buck-Passing and the Wrong Ki…The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation (2000)The Causal-Doxastic Theory of…Why Suspend Judging? (2015)Why Suspend Judging?QUESTION‐DIRECTED ATTITUDES* (2013)QUESTION‐DIRECTED ATTITUDES*Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought (2011)Epistemic Ought is a Commensu…Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons (2012)Reasons First (2021)Brentano and Intrinsic Value. (1989)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Elusive knowledge (1996)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)The Value of Understanding (2009)Belief as Question‐Sensitive (2016)Know-How and Gradability (2017)The Moral Problem (1994)The Sources of Normativity (1996)Against Content Normativity (2009)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)QUESTIONS IN MONTAGUE ENGLISH (1976)Syntax and semantics of questions (1977)The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. (1994)Inquiry and Belief (2017)Inquisitive Semantics (2018)Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (1997)Sentiment and Value (2000)Moral Realism (1986)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Fittingness First (2016)Responsibility for believing (2006)On What Matters (2011)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2005Why Be Rational?709 cited
  • 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism448 cited
  • 2005The Wrong Kind of Reason403 cited
  • 2010The Domain of Reasons387 cited
  • 2012Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason279 cited
  • 2007Brentano and the Buck-Passers224 cited
  • 2007Knowing the Answer214 cited
  • 2004Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons173 cited
  • 2018Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values166 cited
  • 2008The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem148 cited
  • 2000The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation104 cited
  • 2011Believing For a Reason90 cited
  • 2009The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons85 cited

Cited by

  • 2015Why Suspend Judging?319 cited
  • 2013QUESTION‐DIRECTED ATTITUDES*292 cited
  • 2011Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought23 cited

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