How to Disagree about How to Disagree

Adam Elga

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

This chapter argues for the incoherence of unrestricted conciliatory views according to which one ought always to modify one's view in the direction of one's peer in cases of peer disagreement. It contends that such views face incoherence when applied to themselves, and goes on to defend a partly-conciliatory view, recommending conciliation on topics other than disagreement itself.

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References

2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News 2005The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement 2010Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence 2007Reasonable Religious Disagreements 2015Reflection and disagreement 1971Immodest Inductive Methods

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2013The Epistemology of Disagreement 2011Rational self-doubt and the failure of closure 2013Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment 2010THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOGIC 2020Conversational Pressure 2019Knowing Our Limits 2019Moral Knowledge 2018Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement

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