References

• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
• 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
• 2005Deception: The Role of Consequences1,732 cited
• 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
• 1975On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.1,584 cited
• 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
• 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
• 1992Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement1,085 cited
• 1998Incentives in Organizations1,023 cited
• 2002The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives996 cited
• 1993Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts921 cited
• 1994Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.914 cited
• 1980Experience, Performance, and Earnings666 cited
• 1998Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness