Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice

José Edgardo Campos

34 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Regulation and Compliance Studies Legal and Constitutional Studies Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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JOSE EDGARDO L. CAMPOS; Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choi

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1966The Logic of Collective Action.1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew 1948On the Rationale of Group Decision-making 1981The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics 1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets 1979Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models 1976Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control

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