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Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice
16 references·0 citing·32 second hop
Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice (1989)Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and t…The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff (2016)The Economics of Special Inte…Congressional procedures and the policy process (1996)Congressional procedures and …The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets (1988)The Industrial Organization o…Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas (1985)Political influence motives a…The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics (1981)The Political Economy of Bene…Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979)Institutional Arrangements an…A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms (1979)A Rational Choice Perspective…Congressmen in Committees. By Richard F. FennoJr. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. Pp. xvii, 302. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.) (1977)Congressmen in Committees. By…Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (1977)Congress: Keystone of the Was…Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Toward a More General Theory …Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976)Intransitivities in multidime…Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew (1975)Congress: The Electoral Conne…Theory of voting (1969)Theory of votingThe Logic of Collective Action. (1966)The Logic of Collective Actio…U.S. Senators and Their World. (1961)U.S. Senators and Their World.On the Rationale of Group Decision-making (1948)On the Rationale of Group Dec…The Nature of the Firm (1937)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics (2000)Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum (1972)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties (1990)Party Policy in Modern Democracies (2006)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions (1999)Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts (2013)The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas (1995)Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence (1993)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers (2000)Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives (2006)Press Coverage and Political Accountability (2010)A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)The Regulation of Entry (2000)World Investment Report (2017)Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination (1992)Social Theory of International Politics (1999)Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy (1995)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1966The Logic of Collective Action.11,364 cited
  • 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
  • 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew3,130 cited
  • 1948On the Rationale of Group Decision-making2,461 cited
  • 1981The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics1,738 cited
  • 1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets1,527 cited
  • 1979Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models1,484 cited
  • 1976Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control1,340 cited
  • 1977Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment1,228 cited
  • 1977Congressmen in Committees. By Richard F. FennoJr. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. Pp. xvii, 302. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)945 cited
  • 1979A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms666 cited
  • 1969Theory of voting634 cited
  • 1961U.S. Senators and Their World.553 cited
  • 1996Congressional procedures and the policy process422 cited
  • 2016The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff

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244 cited
  • 1985Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas96 cited
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