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Performance Surprises and Uncertain Managerial Ability: Evidence from CEO Turnovers
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Performance Surprises and Uncertain Managerial Ability: Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2008)Performance Surprises and Uncertain Manag…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationThe economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)The economic implications of …The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting (2004)The Economic Implications of …Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation (2003)Institutional Investors and E…Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises (2002)Management's Incentives to Av…Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2001)Boards of Directors as an End…Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Managerial Incentive Problems…Chapter 38 Executive compensation (1999)Chapter 38 Executive compensa…Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board (1997)Leadership structure: Separat…Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Higher market valuation of co…Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO (1995)Endogenously Chosen Boards of…Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1991)Optimal Incentive Contracts i…Stock prices and top management changes (1988)Stock prices and top manageme…Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Outside directors and CEO tur…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management (2002)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (1965)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship* (2005)Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations (1991)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field (2001)Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods (2008)A review of tax research (2010)Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management (2011)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value (2003)How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆ (2009)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies (1992)Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation (2005)Monitoring: Which institutions matter? (2007)Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders (2010)Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation (2003)Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences (2010)Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting (2010)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 (2003)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)
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References

  • 1973Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests14,248 cited
  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors6,614 cited
  • 2005The economic implications of corporate financial reporting6,337 cited
  • 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover4,251 cited
  • 1999Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective3,169 cited
  • 2001Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature2,499 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 2003Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation2,012 cited
  • 2004The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting1,998 cited
  • 1991Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence1,876 cited
  • 1995Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO1,719 cited
  • 2002Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises1,615 cited
  • 1988Stock prices and top management changes1,572 cited
  • 1999Chapter 38 Executive compensation1,569 cited
  • 1997

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Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
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