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Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation
16 references·0 citing·47 second hop
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation (2017)Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subj…Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health? (2014)Do Physicians' Financial Ince…The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study (2012)The Market for Financial Advi…How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation (2011)How payment systems affect ph…Optimal Delegation (2008)Optimal DelegationOn Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods (2006)On Doctors, Mechanics, and Co…Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Relational Incentive ContractsOptimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation (2003)Optimal Contracting with Subj…Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts (1997)Credence Goods and Fraudulent…Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts (1994)Subjective Performance Measur…Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts (1993)Subjective Performance Measur…Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services (1993)Competition in a Market for I…Multistage Games with Communication (1986)Multistage Games with Communi…Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. (1985)Bayesian Models in Economic T…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud (1973)Free Competition and the Opti…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)The economic institutions of capitalism firms, markets, relational contracting (1985)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? (2005)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2011)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1993)Money Is Memory (1998)Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm (2002)Information and Consumer Behavior (1970)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)“Golden Age,” Quiescence, and Revival (2011)The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition (2011)Game Theory and Information Economics (2018)Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. (1987)Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss? (1992)Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care (2001)In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare’s Influence on Private Physician Payments (2016)Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It (2018)Physician Beliefs and Patient Preferences: A New Look at Regional Variation in Health Care Spending (2019)Assessing Affirmative ActionLabor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange (1982)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement (2007)Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education (2008)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance (1981)Evaluating the Potential of Interactive Media through a New Lens: Search versus Experience Goods (1998)The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines (1997)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1973Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud3,943 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
  • 1994Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts955 cited
  • 1993Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts921 cited
  • 2006On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods746 cited
  • 1986Multistage Games with Communication588 cited
  • 2014Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?486 cited
  • 2003Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation424 cited
  • 1985Bayesian Models in Economic Theory.414 cited
  • 2008Optimal Delegation360 cited
  • 1997Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts360 cited
  • 2012The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study333 cited
  • 1993Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services308 cited
  • 2011How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation

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