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Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality
2 references·16 citing·42 second hop
Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality (1999)Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modali…IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (1997)IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY…Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. (1993)Sensations: A Defense of Type…Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong (2015)Metaphysical Emergence: Weak …Against Egalitarianism (2013)Against EgalitarianismPhenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap (2010)Phenomenal Concepts and the E…On the Source of Necessity (2010)On the Source of NecessityModal Commitments (2010)Modal CommitmentsConceivability and Apparent Possibility (2010)Conceivability and Apparent P…Abduction and Modality (2010)Abduction and ModalityThe Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism (2009)The Two‐Dimensional Argument …The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism (2009)The Knowledge Argument and Ep…THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENT (2007)THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENTPhenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap (2007)Phenomenal Concepts and the E…The evidential status of philosophical intuition (2005)The evidential status of phil…Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness (2005)Cognitive Architecture, Conce…Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument (2004)Phenomenal Concepts and the K…Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences (2004)Phenomenal Concepts and Highe…Qualia, Properties, Modality (2003)Qualia, Properties, ModalityPhilosophical Investigations. (1954)Naming and Necessity (1972)Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984)Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought (2005)Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much (2005)Phenomenal Concepts (2009)Concepts and Consciousness (1999)The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1969)What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974)Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015)Reasons and theories of sensory affect (2018)The illusion of conscious experience (2019)What are natural concepts? A design perspective (2019)On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory (1996)Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness (2009)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1 (2011)Acquaintance and the mind–body problem (2012)Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis) (1974)The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992)The Conscious Mind (1996)Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism (2016)Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers (2017)Combining Minds (2019)The Problem of the Essential Indexical (1979)The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology (2011)The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism (2015)THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT FOR PHENOMENAL POWERS (2017)An Argument for the Identity Theory (1966)Should a materialist believe in Qualia? (1995)Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem (2000)The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel (2013)Philosophy of Linguistics (2019)The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015 (2019)Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts (2005)Ignorance and Imagination (2006)The Heterogeneity of the Imagination (2011)How many concepts of consciousness? (1995)The Folk Psychology of Consciousness* (2011)Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem (2017)The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (2007)Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1997IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM304 cited
  • 1993Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.200 cited

Cited by

  • 2009The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism163 cited
  • 2015Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong154 cited
  • 2007Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap117 cited
  • 2013Against Egalitarianism99 cited
  • 2010Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap92 cited
  • 2004Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences90 cited
  • 2005Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness76 cited
  • 2007THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENT55 cited
  • 2009The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism51 cited
  • 2010On the Source of Necessity46 cited
  • 2003Qualia, Properties, Modality45 cited
  • 2005The evidential status of philosophical intuition44 cited
  • 2004Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument44 cited
  • 2010Abduction and Modality39 cited

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  • 2010Conceivability and Apparent Possibility36 cited
  • 2010Modal Commitments23 cited