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Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
15 references·3 citing·37 second hopsampled
Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions (2005)Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous As…Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Demand Reduction and Ineffici…An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004)An Efficient Ascending-Bid Au…Tacit collusion in repeated auctions (2003)Tacit collusion in repeated a…Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions (2003)Bid rotation and collusion in…Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002)Collusion via Signalling in S…Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2000)Putting Auction Theory to Wor…The Ascending Auction Paradox (1999)The Ascending Auction ParadoxStrategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions (1998)Strategic Jump Bidding in Eng…Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices (1998)Multi-unit auctions with unif…The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (1997)The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An…Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales (1997)Bidder Collusion at Forest Se…Analyzing the Airwaves Auction (1996)Analyzing the Airwaves AuctionM oney O ut of T hin A i r: T he n ationwide N arrowband pcs A uction (1995)M oney O ut of T hin A i r: T…Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi-unit demands (1995)Equilibria in a multi-object …Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment (1993)Auctions of Divisible Goods: …Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions (2018)Weak cartels and collusion-pr…Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects (2018)Empirical Work on Auctions of…Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints (2007)Simultaneous ascending auctio…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)Auctions of Shares (1979)Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1985)The Package Assignment Model (2002)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply (2005)The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (2000)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Matching with Contracts (2005)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Incentives in Teams (1973)Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)Auctions and Auctioneering (1967)Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions (1987)Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2000)Identification of Standard Auction Models (2002)Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions* (2011)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Why new issues are underpriced (1986)Special Repo Rates (1996)Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information (2001)Tradeable carbon permit auctions (2002)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions (2004)Strategic Analysis of Auctions (2021)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities (1997)Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities (2003)Spectrum Auction Design (2013)
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References

  • 2014Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions800 cited
  • 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects727 cited
  • 2000Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction684 cited
  • 1996Analyzing the Airwaves Auction531 cited
  • 1993Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment517 cited
  • 1997The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment330 cited
  • 1997Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales303 cited
  • 1998Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices254 cited
  • 1995M oney O ut of T hin A i r: T he n ationwide N arrowband pcs A uction210 cited
  • 1998Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions205 cited
  • 2003Tacit collusion in repeated auctions165 cited
  • 2003Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions156 cited
  • 2002Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities133 cited
  • 1995Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi-unit demands111 cited
  • 1999The Ascending Auction Paradox60 cited

Cited by

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  • 2007Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints48 cited
  • 2018Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions39 cited
  • 2018Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects39 cited