Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function

John C. Harsanyi

119 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Conflict Resolution

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Applications Conflict Management and Negotiation Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

1 The original version of this paper was written at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under Contract Nonr-358 (01), NR 047-006 of the Cowles Foundation with the Office of Naval Research. It was distributed as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 46. A revised version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Game Theory and Negotiations in October, 1961. The paper has benefited from comments by the other participants of the Conference. 2 But of course there are exceptions. For a model dealing with the case where the players do not know one another's utility functions, see (Luce and Adams, 1956). know (and know they do not know) each other's utility functions. I shall also indicate some interesting problems our analysis raises for empirical research.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 119 citations exist upstream.

References

1950The Bargaining Problem 1953Two-Person Cooperative Games 2018Problems Of Monopoly And Economic Warfare 1956Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories 1982Approaches to the Bargaining Problem before and after the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories 1957Bargaining, communication, and limited war

Cited by

1969The effect of time pressure, time elapsed, and the opponent's concession rate on behavior in negotiation 1967Negotiating the division of a reward under incomplete information 1990The influence of experience on negotiation performance 2009Introduction to Game Theory 2019Innovation Commons 2021The Benefits and Obstacles to Perspective Getting

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.