An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining

Axel Ockenfels · Reinhard Selten

59 citations0/0 files storedGames and Economic Behavior

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Deception detection and forensic psychology

Abstract

We examine face-to-face interaction in a two-person bargaining game with incomplete information in which each bargainer can either have costs to be subtracted from his/her bargaining agreement payoff or not. The bargaining events are observed by onlookers who guess the cost situations of the participants. The work of D. Gauthier (1978, Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon) and R. H. Frank (1988, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: Norton) suggests that the onlookers' detection accuracy exceeds chance accuracy because of involuntary signals inherent in the behavior of the bargainers. It is shown that cost guesses are somewhat more accurate than chance. This effect, however, is entirely explainable by the onlookers' information about objective features of the bargaining process. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C91, D70, D82.

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References

1995The Handbook of experimental economics 1989Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions 1987Morals by Agreement 1985Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage 1981Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception 1995Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 2020The Handbook of Experimental Economics 1977Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.

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