Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?

Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.

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2008Internal and External Reasons 2003Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique 1997Ethics and Practical Reason 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism 2004Reasons 2006No Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief 2007The Normative Web 2008The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

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2011Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought 2014Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action*

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