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Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?
12 references·2 citing·40 second hop
Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism? (2008)Does Doxastic Transparency Support Eviden…Weighing the aim of belief (2008)Weighing the aim of beliefThe possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem (2008)The possibility of pragmatic …Internal and External Reasons (2008)Internal and External ReasonsThe Normative Web (2007)The Normative WebNo Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief (2006)No Norm Needed: on the Aim of…A New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)A New Argument for Evidential…Reasons (2004)ReasonsEnticing Reasons (2004)Enticing ReasonsOn the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action (1997) (2003)On the Hypothetical and Non-H…Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique (2003)Epistemic Rationality as Inst…Ethics and Practical Reason (1997)Ethics and Practical ReasonMAKING UP YOUR MIND (1988)MAKING UP YOUR MINDReasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action* (2014)Reasons for Belief, Reasons f…Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought (2011)Epistemic Ought is a Commensu…Direction of Fit (1992)Assure and Threaten (1994)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)Against Content Normativity (2009)In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity (2014)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)The Aim Of Belief (2002)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (2020)The Epistemic and the Zetetic (2020)Deciding to believe (1973)Belief's Own Ethics (2002)The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)Exercising Doxastic Freedom (2011)No Exception for Belief (2015)Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)Human Agency and Language (1985)Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1985)Being Known (1999)Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life (2005)What is human agency? (2012)Moral Realism (1986)Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Fittingness First (2016)Reasons First (2021)The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it (2009)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)What Happens When Someone Acts? (1992)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)The Nature of Normativity (2007)The Constitution of Agency (2008)Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009)Reasons and Impossibility (2006)Understanding standing: permission to deflect reasons (2016)Opting for the Best (2019)Ethics Without Principles (2004)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2008Internal and External Reasons1,342 cited
  • 2003Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique610 cited
  • 1997Ethics and Practical Reason573 cited
  • 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism448 cited
  • 2004Reasons335 cited
  • 2007The Normative Web255 cited
  • 2006No Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief244 cited
  • 2008The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem148 cited
  • 2004Enticing Reasons145 cited
  • 1988MAKING UP YOUR MIND117 cited
  • 2008Weighing the aim of belief81 cited
  • 2003On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action (1997)73 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought23 cited
  • 2014Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action*19 cited

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