Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

Abstract

Abstract We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 149 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.