The Moral Dilemmas of Court Interpreting

Abstract

In court interpreting, the law distinguishes between the prescribed activity of what it considers translation - defined as an objective, mechanistic, transparent process in which the interpreter acts as a mere conduit of words - and the proscribed activity of interpretation, which involves interpreters decoding and attempting to convey their understanding of speaker meanings and intentions. This article discusses the practicability of this cut-and-dried legal distinction between translation and interpretation and speculates on the reasons for its existence. An attempt is made to illustrate some of the moral dilemmas that confront court interpreters, and an argument is put forward for a more realistic understanding of their role and a major improvement in their professional status; as recognized professionals, court interpreters can more readily assume the latitude they need in order to ensure effective communication in the courtroom.

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