Article2011

Normative models in psychology are here to stay

15 citations0/0 files storedBehavioral and Brain Sciences

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Abstract Elqayam & Evans (E&E) drive a wedge between Bayesianism and instrumental rationality that most decision scientists will not recognize. Their analogy from linguistics to judgment and decision making is inapt. Normative models remain extremely useful in the progressive research programs of the judgment and decision making field.

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References

1981Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?2004The Oxford Handbook of Rationality 1994Rationality: psychological and philosophical perspectives 1983Inductive reasoning: Competence or skill?2004The Oxford Handbook of Rationality 2009Probability matching in choice under uncertainty: Intuition versus deliberation

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2015Stanovich's arguments against the “adaptive rationality” project: An assessment 2017How Bayesian Rationality Fails and Critical Rationality Works

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