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An efficient solution to the informed principal problem

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References

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1999A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information50 cited
2007Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus49 cited

Cited by

2012Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values40 cited
2017Verifiable disclosure38 cited

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