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Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
14 references·16 citing·32 second hop
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Optimal incentive contracts with multiple…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Prizes and Incentives: Toward…Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Prices and Incentives: Toward…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts (1983)A Comparison of Tournaments a…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsAsymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation (1982)Asymmetric Information, Incen…Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Economically Optimal Performa…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…Awarding Monopoly Franchises (2016)Awarding Monopoly FranchisesImplications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports (2014)Implications of power: When t…Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives (2008)Inequity Aversion and Team In…Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information (2008)Implementation, contracts, an…Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Chapter 27 Recent Development…Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Regulation, Competition, and …A crash course in implementation theory (2001)A crash course in implementat…Price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues (1996)Price stabilization as a bond…I nformation , C ontrol , and O rganizational S tructure (1992)I nformation , C ontrol , and…Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules (1992)Dominant strategy implementat…Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Chapter 2 The theory of the f…Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents (1988)Unique Implementation of Ince…Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Subgame Perfect ImplementationStopping agents from “cheating” (1988)Stopping agents from “cheatin…Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor (1987)Optimal Contracts with a Util…THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT PART I (1985)THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND A…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales (1976)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985)Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry (1996)Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (2002)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)The Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price (1987)Pay Equality and Industrial Politics (1989)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)SOME LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1983Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition1,111 cited
  • 1983A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts1,002 cited
  • 1983Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition975 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1982Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation478 cited
  • 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems354 cited

Cited by

  • 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation463 cited
  • 1989

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Chapter 2 The theory of the firm
442 cited
  • 2007Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation421 cited
  • 2006Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization391 cited
  • 2001A crash course in implementation theory374 cited
  • 1985THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT PART I263 cited
  • 1992Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules232 cited
  • 2016Awarding Monopoly Franchises224 cited
  • 2008Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information213 cited
  • 1988Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents169 cited
  • 1996Price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues158 cited
  • 1988Stopping agents from “cheating”158 cited
  • 2008Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives155 cited
  • 1992I nformation , C ontrol , and O rganizational S tructure154 cited
  • 2014Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports146 cited
  • 1987Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor139 cited