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Dretske's awful answer
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Dretske's awful answer (1995)Dretske's awful answerAcquaintance (2021)AcquaintanceThe search for invertebrate consciousness (2020)The search for invertebrate c…Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent (2019)Everything is clear: All perc…Valence and Value (2017)Valence and ValueThe Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding (2015)The Role of Consciousness in …The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology (2013)The Nature of Cognitive Pheno…Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin? (2011)Is Perceptual Phenomenology T…Imagining as a Guide to Possibility (2010)Imagining as a Guide to Possi…ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT 1 (2010)ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT 1Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content (2009)Transparency, Intentionalism,…INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE (2007)INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL…CONTENT AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2007)CONTENT AND THE STREAM OF CON…SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation (2004)SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theo…Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences (2004)Phenomenal Concepts and Highe…How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes? (2004)How Hard Are the Sceptical Pa…Experience as Representation (2003)Experience as RepresentationThe Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1969)Phenomenology of Perception (1982)PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENOLOGY (2012)Phenomenology of Perception (2013)Recent issues in high‐level perception (2016)Mental Imagery (2023)The Principles of Psychology (1891)Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two Ears (1953)Intentionality (1983)Object-sensitivity versus cognitive penetrability of perception (2012)Attention Is Amplification, Not Selection (2018)A Study of Concepts (1992)Naturalizing The Mind (1995)Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995)Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism (2013)Appearance and Illusion (2014)On Experiencing High-Level Properties (2014)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Naming and Necessity (1972)What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974)The Meanings of “Imagine” Part I: Constructive Imagination (2013)The Two Faces of Mental Imagery (2019)Unconscious mental imagery (2020)Knowledge and the Flow of Information. (1983)On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995)What’s so Transparent about Transparency? (2003)Imperative content and the painfulness of pain (2010)The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience (2021)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Skeptical Arguments (2004)Either/Or (2008)Epistemic Angst (2016)New work for a theory of universals (1983)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content? (2010)Hallucination (2013)Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)Structural Representations and the Brain (2012)Untangling two questions about mental representation (2015)Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Intentionality (2017)A circumplex model of affect. (1980)Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. (2003)Emotion Regulation: Current Status and Future Prospects (2015)More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character (2019)On Valence: Imperative or Representation of Value? (2021)Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value (2022)A cognitive theory of consciousness (1988)Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing (2011)Animal sentience (2022)Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024)The Edge of Sentience (2024)
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  • 2010Imagining as a Guide to Possibility314 cited
  • 2020The search for invertebrate consciousness253 cited
  • 2003Experience as Representation214 cited
  • 2007INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE188 cited
  • 2017Valence and Value177 cited
  • 2009Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content169 cited
  • 2010ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT 1134 cited
  • 2011Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?123 cited
  • 2004How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes?118 cited
  • 2004SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation113 cited
  • 2019Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent99 cited
  • 2021Acquaintance98 cited
  • 2007CONTENT AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS95 cited
  • 2015The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding91 cited
  • 2013The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology90 cited
  • 2004Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences90 cited

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