The relationship between ethics, common sense, and rationality

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to re‐think the definition of three commonly used terms; discuss links between ethics, common sense and rationality; offer a model integrating these; and present findings regarding the understanding of common sense and rationality. Design/methodology/approach The paper reports on data collected from a convenient sample on their definitions of common sense and rationality. A constant comparison method of analysis is used to identify common themes in the definitions from this sample of 38 responses. Percentages and Yule's Q statistical data as well as descriptive statistics of demographics are obtained and examined. Findings Our findings indicate that a much higher percentage of respondents understand common sense to have a very similar meaning to the literary definition than those understanding the literary meaning of rationality. Statistical analysis of the findings agree. Research limitations/implications Further research should include a random sample and definitions of the term “ethics” and further consider the integration of ethics, common sense and rationality. Practical implications One implication of this research is to focus on a common understanding of these terms to those who use them. The model presented is intended to provide practical perception of the integration of ethics, common sense and rationality for application in management and life. Originality/value This paper adds to current literature on ethics, common sense, and rationality by extensive literature review of all three and combining that research as not presented previously. We offer a view that integrates common sense, rationality and ethics from distant philosophers and considers the current lack of literature connecting the three as shown in the form of a Figure.

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