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Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy
11 references·5 citing·43 second hop
Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy (1986)Commitment to regulatory bureaucracyHierarchical Regulatory Control (1987)Hierarchical Regulatory Contr…Delegated Expertise (1987)Delegated ExpertiseProcurement and Renegotiation (1986)Procurement and RenegotiationPlanning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect (1985)Planning under Incomplete Inf…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process (1979)The Regulation Game: Strategi…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityA Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation (1979)A Decentralized Method for Ut…Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion (1970)Input Choices and Rate-of-Ret…Incentives for innovation and centralized versus delegated capital budgeting (2012)Incentives for innovation and…Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation (2011)Subjective Performance and th…Abandonment Options and Information System Design (2003)Abandonment Options and Infor…Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process (1995)Chapter 12 Incentive models o…Designing incentive regulation (1994)Designing incentive regulationThe Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Allocative efficiency vs. X-Efficiency (1966)Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory (1983)Incentives for Cost Reduction under Price Cap Regulation (1991)Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries: Evidence from the Health Care Sector (2008)Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint (2016)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1977)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Chapter 15 Labor markets in low-income countries (1988)Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing (1991)Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process (1994)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)Redistributive taxation as social insurance (1980)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality (1985)Chapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007)Weaponizing economics: Big Oil, economic consultants, and climate policy delay (2021)Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous (2003)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)The Socialist System (1992)Customer Poaching and Brand Switching (2000)Credence goods monopolists (2001)Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry (2006)Portfolio Performance and Agency (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1985Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect517 cited
  • 1979A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation349 cited
  • 1970Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion346 cited
  • 1986Procurement and Renegotiation337 cited
  • 1987Delegated Expertise167 cited
  • 1979The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process159 cited
  • 1987Hierarchical Regulatory Control73 cited

Cited by

  • 1994Designing incentive regulation60 cited
  • 2011Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation45 cited
  • 2012Incentives for innovation and centralized versus delegated capital budgeting40 cited
  • 1995Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process32 cited
  • 2003Abandonment Options and Information System Design

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26 cited