OUTCOME-BASED PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Abstract

We argue that direct democracy forms a specific context for NPM reform, with the voting population as a third agent beside legislature and executive constituting a considerable limit to the legislature's political steering capacity. In this context we expect that NPM will lead to a shift in political power between sovereign, legislature and administration. This article investigates the possibilities of outcome-based public management to ameliorate public action under these circumstances. The findings of the analysis of the NPM reform in the Swiss city of Bern indicate that problems of outcome-based public management are accentuated in a direct democratic system. The puzzling finding is that while the political players themselves see a shift in power between the electorate, legislature and executive, they are doing nothing to compensate this shift.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 22 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.