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The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers
13 references·2 citing·36 second hop
The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers (1976)The incentives for correct revelation of …Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem (1977)Optimal Allocation of Public …The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies (1976)The Incentives for Price-Taki…Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem (1976)Partial equilibrium approach …Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Incentives and public inputs (1975)Incentives and public inputsCore and Equilibria of a Large Economy. (1975)Core and Equilibria of a Larg…Topological Methods in Walrasian Economics (1974)Topological Methods in Walras…Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior (1974)Group size, group homo-geneit…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak. (1973)Decision and Organization: A …Theory of value with public goods: A survey article (1972)Theory of value with public g…A Tatonement Process for Public Goods (1971)A Tatonement Process for Publ…The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954)The Pure Theory of Public Exp…Does Privatization Improve Job Satisfaction? The Case of Ghana (2007)Does Privatization Improve Jo…The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey* (1979)The Free‐Rider Problem: A Sur…The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1934)The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1957)An Economic Theory of Alliances (1966)Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism (1988)The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II. (1988)Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox (2001)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1969)Incentives in Teams (1973)A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices (1976)Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries (1989)Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy (1954)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilibrium and Stability (1974)The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy (1977)The epsilon core of a large replica game (1983)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)The Political Economy of Federalism (1985)Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (2005)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice (1977)Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods (1980)Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems (1992)The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large (1989)Strategy-Proof Exchange (1995)Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms (2005)Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy (1981)A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design (1999)Assortative Matching and Search (2000)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure7,498 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1975Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy.1,195 cited
  • 1977Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem823 cited
  • 1975Incentives and public inputs325 cited
  • 1976The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies291 cited
  • 1972Theory of value with public goods: A survey article221 cited
  • 1974Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior180 cited
  • 1971A Tatonement Process for Public Goods180 cited
  • 1974Topological Methods in Walrasian Economics148 cited
  • 1973Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak.136 cited
  • 1976Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem88 cited

Cited by

  • 1979The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey*67 cited
  • 2007Does Privatization Improve Job Satisfaction? The Case of Ghana

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23 cited