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Intrinsic correlation in games
15 references·4 citing·38 second hop
Intrinsic correlation in games (2007)Intrinsic correlation in gamesInterim Correlated Rationalizability (2007)Interim Correlated Rationaliz…Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability (2005)Hierarchies of belief and int…Rationalization and Incomplete Information (2003)Rationalization and Incomplet…Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games (1999)Hierarchies of Conditional Be…Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (1997)Order Independence for Iterat…Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation (1989)Stable Equilibria—A Reformula…Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989)Approximating common knowledg…The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games (1988)The Bayesian foundations of s…Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (1987)Rationalizability and Correla…Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Correlated Equilibrium as an …On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Strategic Stability of…Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Subjectivity and correlation …Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment (2018)Strategic Reasoning in Persua…The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games (2009)The relationship between quan…On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information (2009)On redundant types and Bayesi…Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage Incumbents? (2009)Do the Advantages of Incumben…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games (1992)Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games (1995)Games and Decisions (2015)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Foundations of Social Evolution (1998)A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)Sequential Equilibria (1982)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)A Theory of Conformity (1994)Definite reference and mutual knowledge (1981)Elements of discourse understanding . Edited by Aravind K. Joshi, Bonnie L. Webber, and Ivan A. Sag. Cambridge: University Press, 1981. Pp. ix, 341. $32.50. (1983)LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION (2012)Game Theory (2013)Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change* (2013)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (1987)Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent (1990)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory (1999)Admissibility in Games (2008)Social Stability and Equilibrium (1991)Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (1993)A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007)Cheap Talk (1996)
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References

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  • 1987Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality1,613 cited
  • 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection1,407 cited
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Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage Incumbents?
74 cited
  • 2018Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment43 cited
  • 2009The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games42 cited
  • 2009On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information38 cited