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Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
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  • 2002Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities133 cited
  • 2015Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations127 cited
  • 2010Monotonicity and Implementability92 cited
  • 2008Characterization of Revenue Equivalence91 cited
  • 2001Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade82 cited
  • 2002Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design72 cited
  • 2016On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions71 cited
  • 2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms58 cited
  • 2012Mechanism design without revenue equivalence57 cited
  • 2013Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources47 cited
  • 2007Weak monotonicity and Bayes–Nash incentive compatibility45 cited
  • 2007A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence40 cited
  • 2014General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis39 cited
  • 2011A nonsmooth approach to nonexpected utility theory under risk12 cited
  • 2014A NOTE ON THE INTEGRAL REPRESENTATION OF THE VALUE FUNCTION

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