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The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

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References

1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited

Cited by

1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
1992How hard is it to control an election?391 cited
2007When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?348 cited
2016The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare346 cited
2019The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare291 cited
2007A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice264 cited
2002Complexity of Mechanism Design251 cited
2007Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative249 cited
2009Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control242 cited
2003Democracy Defended240 cited
2007How to rank with few errors239 cited
2009How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?238 cited

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2002

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria

234 cited

2006Methodologies and Algorithms for Group-Rankings Decision212 cited

2007On the complexity of achieving proportional representation192 cited

2010AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?191 cited