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Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
16 references·1 citing·37 second hop
Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard (1994)Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric …Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts (1992)Vertical Control with Bilater…The Handbook of Industrial Organization (1991)The Handbook of Industrial Or…Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency (1991)Moral Hazard and Verifiabilit…Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement (1990)Adverse Selection and Renegot…Vertical contractual relations (1989)Vertical contractual relationsUsing Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…The Logic of Vertical Restraints (1985)The Logic of Vertical Restrai…The Economics of Franchise Contracts (1985)The Economics of Franchise Co…A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985)A Theory of Yardstick Competi…Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification (1984)Resale Price Maintenance and …An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints (1984)An Economic Theory of Vertica…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1979)The Antitrust Paradox: A Poli…Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? (1960)Why Should Manufacturers Want…Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy (1950)Vertical Integration and Anti…Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers (2013)Wholesale price discriminatio…The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form (1988)HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM GROWTH AND SURVIVAL: A STUDY OF NEW FRANCHISORS. (1996)The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1997)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Selection and Evolution of Industry (2004)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms (1988)Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure (1990)Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment (2004)Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration (1991)On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects (2001)Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry (2001)The Architecture of Government (2007)Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence (2007)Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1950Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy1,617 cited
  • 1985A Theory of Yardstick Competition1,414 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1979The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself796 cited
  • 1985The Economics of Franchise Contracts590 cited
  • 1960Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?564 cited
  • 1984An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints492 cited
  • 1985The Logic of Vertical Restraints411 cited
  • 1992Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts402 cited
  • 1990Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement323 cited
  • 1991Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency243 cited
  • 1984Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification241 cited
  • 1989Vertical contractual relations229 cited
  • 1991The Handbook of Industrial Organization223 cited

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  • 2013Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers15 cited