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I ncentive C ontracting U nder L imited L iability
9 references·8 citing·37 second hop
I ncentive C ontracting U nder L imited L iability (1995)I ncentive C ontracting U nder L imited L…Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Economics, Organization and M…Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance (1992)Managerial compensation and t…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990)Limited liability and incenti…Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1988)Justifying the First-Order Ap…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Proportional incentive contracts in live streaming commerce supply chain based on target sales volume (2023)Proportional incentive contra…A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design (2021)A Structural Model of a Multi…Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts (2019)Salesforce Contracting Under …Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing (2016)Technical Note—Impact of Inve…Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers (2015)Do Agents Game Their Agents’ …Internal versus external CEO choice and the structure of compensation contracts (2013)Internal versus external CEO …Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management (2010)Essays in Applied Microeconom…Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem (1996)Mechanism Sufficient Statisti…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993)Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool (2015)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting (1985)Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations (1986)Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift (2010)Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives (2012)Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance. (2017)On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)Redistributive taxation as social insurance (1980)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design (1999)Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2008)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)Upper Echelons Theory: An Update (2007)Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard (1996)Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty (2002)Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1993Economics, Organization and Management.4,644 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices925 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1988Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems511 cited
  • 1992Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance99 cited

Cited by

  • 1996Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem55 cited
  • 2016Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing34 cited
  • 2019Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts33 cited
  • 2023Proportional incentive contracts in live streaming commerce supply chain based on target sales volume31 cited
  • 2013Internal versus external CEO choice and the structure of compensation contracts25 cited
  • 2021

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design
19 cited
  • 2015Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers19 cited
  • 2010Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management1 cited