Strategic Interaction and Conflict

Abstract

Direct communication between parties is impossible in some conflict situations, and interactants must employ other means of conveying messages to deescalate the conflict or to sucker their opponents into costly maneuvers. Strategic interaction occurs when action displays by one party are to be taken as meaningful communications by the other. Interpretation of these displays depends on cultural or experiential background expectancies, which must be taken into account in the production of strategic displays as well. An Arab-Israeli paradigm illustrates the ways in which display sequences and interpretive procedures are manipulated by interactants to affect the dominant strategy of the fully interdependent games and ultimately affect the outcome of the conflict for the players.

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