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Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
3 references·16 citing·32 second hop
Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Voting schemes for which it can be diffic…Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)Essai sur l'application de l'…Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Condorcet Social Choice Funct…The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)The Theory of Committees and …Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making (2011)Budgeted social choice: from …Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control (2009)Llull and Copeland Voting Com…How Hard Is Bribery in Elections? (2009)How Hard Is Bribery in Electi…When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)When are elections with few c…On the complexity of achieving proportional representation (2007)On the complexity of achievin…A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007)A Short Introduction to Compu…The complexity of Kemeny elections (2005)The complexity of Kemeny elec…Reflective Democracy (2003)Reflective DemocracyDemocracy Defended (2003)Democracy DefendedSocial Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2002)Social Choice Theory and Deli…Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria (2002)Complexity Results about Nash…Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)Complexity of Mechanism DesignExact analysis of Dodgson elections (1997)Exact analysis of Dodgson ele…How hard is it to control an election? (1992)How hard is it to control an …Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)Single transferable vote resi…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle (1978)Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice (1986)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997)AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? (2010)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Computational Social Choice (2012)Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2016)Considerations on Representative Government (2010)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)The Evolution of Cooperation (1985)Political participation and three theories of democracy: A research inventory and agenda (2006)Innovations in democratic governance: how does citizen participation contribute to a better democracy? (2011)The decision and the organization (1965)A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting (1980)Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative (2007)The Interpretation of Cultures (1974)Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (1985)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990)When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy (2003)Sequencing Deliberative Moments (2005)Can the all-affected principle include future persons? Green deliberative democracy and the non-identity problem (2008)Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (1996)Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections (1996)The Place of Self‐Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy* (2009)Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement (1976)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.2,822 cited
  • 2014Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix1,418 cited
  • 1977Condorcet Social Choice Functions567 cited

Cited by

  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 2002Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation445 cited
  • 1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
  • 1992How hard is it to control an election?391 cited
  • 2003Reflective Democracy351 cited
  • 2007When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?348 cited
  • 2007A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice264 cited
  • 2002Complexity of Mechanism Design251 cited
  • 2009Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control242 cited
  • 2003Democracy Defended240 cited
  • 2009How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?238 cited
  • 2002Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria234 cited
  • 2011Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making

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208 cited
  • 2007On the complexity of achieving proportional representation192 cited
  • 1997Exact analysis of Dodgson elections186 cited
  • 2005The complexity of Kemeny elections184 cited