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Oughts, Options, and Actualism
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Oughts, Options, and Actualism (1986)Oughts, Options, and ActualismEqual treatment for belief (2018)Equal treatment for beliefDoes “Ought” Imply “Feasible”? (2016)Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”?Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle (2015)Instrumental Normativity: In …Contrastive Reasons and Promotion (2014)Contrastive Reasons and Promo…VI-B ayesian E xpressivism (2012)VI-B ayesian E xpressivismOptions and the subjective ought (2012)Options and the subjective ou…The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions (2011)The Feasibility OF Collective…Measurement and modality: The scalar basis of modal semantics (2011)Measurement and modality: The…DEFENDING DOUBLE EFFECT (2011)DEFENDING DOUBLE EFFECT‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics* (2011)‘Ought’ and Resolution Semant…In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation (2010)In Defense of Objectivism abo…Living with uncertainty: the moral significance of ignorance (2009)Living with uncertainty: the …The Myth of Practical Consistency (2008)The Myth of Practical Consist…Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind (2008)Seeing and believing: percept…The Consequentialist Perspective (1997)The Consequentialist Perspect…Plural and Conflicting Values (1992)Plural and Conflicting ValuesIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason. (1991)The Sources of Normativity (1996)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!) (2016)Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure (2019)Getting Things Right (2022)Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)Utilitarianism and Beyond (1982)Ambivalence and Attitudes (2002)Love Online (2004)Normativity without Cartesian privilege (2015)Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (2020)The General Theory of Second Best (1956)How mental systems believe. (1991)Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2012)Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias (2015)Belief as Question‐Sensitive (2016)Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science (2017)Utilitarianism and Co-operation (1980)Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection (1991)The Right and the Good (2002)The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (2014)Moral Uncertainty (2020)The Morality of Defensive Force (2020)Fuzzy sets (1996)Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (2007)Neg-raising and positive polarity: The view from modals (2015)Anankastic conditionals are just conditionals (2016)Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22, 2 (2018)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Possibility of Practical Reason (2000)Democratic authority: a philosophical framework (2008)Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity (2009)The feasibility issue (2018)Experimental philosophy and the fruitfulness of normative concepts (2019)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. (1988)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)Opting for the Best (2019)The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View* (2019)Inquiry and the epistemic (2021)Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (2018)A theory of justice original editionAnarchy, State, and Utopia (1975)Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella (2004)Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practice (2006)Toward Ethical Information Systems: The Contribution of Discourse Ethics1 (2010)Rationality Through Reasoning (2013)You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ (2016)
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  • 1992Plural and Conflicting Values289 cited
  • 2009Living with uncertainty: the moral significance of ignorance273 cited
  • 2008Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind230 cited
  • 2010In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation224 cited
  • 2011Measurement and modality: The scalar basis of modal semantics178 cited
  • 1997The Consequentialist Perspective161 cited
  • 2018Equal treatment for belief154 cited
  • 2015Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle131 cited
  • 2008The Myth of Practical Consistency117 cited
  • 2016Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”?115 cited
  • 2012VI-B ayesian E xpressivism114 cited
  • 2011DEFENDING DOUBLE EFFECT97 cited
  • 2011The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions93 cited
  • 2011‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics*93 cited
  • 2014Contrastive Reasons and Promotion86 cited
  • 2012Options and the subjective ought80 cited

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