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Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
8 references·9 citing·38 second hop
Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests (1990)Effective cheap talk with conflicting int…Refining cheap-talk equilibria (1991)Refining cheap-talk equilibriaPre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (1989)Pre-play communication in two…Cheap talk can matter in bargaining (1989)Cheap talk can matter in barg…Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry (1987)Cheap Talk, Coordination, and…A Theory of Credibility (1985)A Theory of CredibilityStrategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release (1982)Fulfilled Expectations Courno…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Cheap talk with two-sided private information (2024)Cheap talk with two-sided pri…Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication (2018)Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Oper…Cheap talk with an informed receiver (2015)Cheap talk with an informed r…New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility (2014)New, Like New, or Very Good? …Expert advice for amateurs (2014)Expert advice for amateursValue of public information in sender–receiver games (2011)Value of public information i…Communication with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information (2009)Communication with Two-Sided …Informal communication (2004)Informal communicationCheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games (1996)Cheap Talk and Sequential Equ…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting Standards: Economic Analysis and Review (2019)Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare (1990)Competitive Disadvantage and Discretionary Disclosure in Industries (1997)Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (2020)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making (1992)Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts (2004)Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (2010)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)The relationship of reputation and credibility to brand success (1993)Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections (1994)Can We Trust Social Capital? (2002)The Economics of Information (1976)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)Cheap Talk (1996)Sheep in Sheep's clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other (1997)Deliberative voting (2006)Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (2000)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes (2002)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Job Market Signaling (1973)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Signaling Games (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1985A Theory of Credibility557 cited
  • 1987Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry512 cited
  • 1982Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release308 cited
  • 1989Cheap talk can matter in bargaining243 cited
  • 1991Refining cheap-talk equilibria126 cited
  • 1989Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions125 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Expert advice for amateurs55 cited
  • 2004Informal communication50 cited
  • 1996Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games44 cited
  • 2009Communication with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information44 cited
  • 2014New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility36 cited
  • 2015Cheap talk with an informed receiver35 cited
  • 2011Value of public information in sender–receiver games33 cited
  • 2024Cheap talk with two-sided private information29 cited

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  • 2018Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication22 cited