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The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
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The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor (1991)The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame…THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION (2008)THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFE…The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)The Folk Theorem with Imperfe…Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Toward a Theory of Discounted…Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria (1989)Stability and Perfection of N…Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations (1989)Nash and correlated equilibri…Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria (1987)Stability and Perfection of N…The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated …On Repeated Games with Complete Information (1986)On Repeated Games with Comple…Survey of Repeated Games (1981)Survey of Repeated GamesEssays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern (1981)Essays in game theory and mat…Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (2015)Partners or rivals? Strategie…Stochastic Games (1953)On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (1991)Computing Supergame Equilibria (2003)A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control (2010)Games and Decisions (2015)Sequential Equilibria (1982)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Repeated Games and Reputations (2006)Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness (2012)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Non-cooperative games (1989)Playing large games using simple strategies (2003)Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy (2009)The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium (2009)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism (1971)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (1998)Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? An Examination of Exposure to Agency Theory and Unethical Behavior (2018)Evolutionary game theory (1994)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2010)Matching and agglomeration economies in a system of cities (1990)Evolutionary game dynamics (2003)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties (1990)Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake (1990)The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (1996)Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection (2005)
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References

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  • 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
  • 1989Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria726 cited
  • 1989Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations406 cited
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  • 1981Survey of Repeated Games271 cited
  • 1981Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern188 cited
  • 1986On Repeated Games with Complete Information123 cited
  • 2008THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION78 cited

Cited by

  • 2015Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma137 cited

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