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Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
15 references·16 citing·36 second hop
Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006)Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Determini…Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Towards a characterization of…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)Efficient Design with Interde…Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Computationally feasible VCG …Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Ap…Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities (1999)Multidimensional Mechanism De…How (not) to sell nuclear weapons (1996)How (not) to sell nuclear wea…Auctions and Privatization (1992)Auctions and PrivatizationOptimal Multi-Unit Auctions (1989)Optimal Multi-Unit AuctionsMultidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design (1988)Multidimensional incentive co…Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes (1987)Game-theoretic analyses of tr…A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context (1987)A necessary and sufficient co…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignThe Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Implementation of Social …Aggregation and revelation of preferences (1979)Aggregation and revelation of…Uncertainty in Mechanism Design (2021)Uncertainty in Mechanism Desi…SODA: Strategy-Proof Online Double Auction Scheme for Multimicrogrids Bidding (2017)SODA: Strategy-Proof Online D…An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging (2013)An Online Mechanism for Multi…When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? (2012)When Are Local Incentive Cons…Mechanism design without revenue equivalence (2012)Mechanism design without reve…Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (2011)Multi-unit auctions with budg…Monotonicity and Implementability (2010)Monotonicity and Implementabi…Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions (2010)Inapproximability for VCG-bas…Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (2008)Truthful mechanism design for…Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits (2008)Multi-unit Auctions with Budg…Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2008)Characterization of Revenue E…Weak monotonicity and Bayes–Nash incentive compatibility (2007)Weak monotonicity and Bayes–N…Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (2007)Truthful mechanism design for…Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders (2007)Optimal combinatoric auctions…Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling—An Introduction (2007)Games and Mechanism Design in…Ex post implementation in environments with private goods (2006)Ex post implementation in env…Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)The Winner-Take-All Society (1996)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment (2007)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria (2002)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Haggling over substitutes (2003)Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2005)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design (2002)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values (1989)Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers (2000)The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer (2000)Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics (1979)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Ranking Sets of Objects (2004)Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (2005)Robust game theory (2006)The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2012)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility809 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 1987A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context486 cited
  • 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations483 cited
  • 1979Aggregation and revelation of preferences430 cited
  • 1987Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes367 cited
  • 1996How (not) to sell nuclear weapons344 cited
  • 2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms325 cited
  • 1999Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities297 cited
  • 1988Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design281 cited
  • 1989Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions256 cited
  • 2004Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions233 cited
  • 1992Auctions and Privatization232 cited
  • 1999Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions223 cited

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  • 2011

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Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
148 cited
  • 2010Monotonicity and Implementability92 cited
  • 2012When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?91 cited
  • 2008Characterization of Revenue Equivalence91 cited
  • 2008Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits85 cited
  • 2007Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling—An Introduction79 cited
  • 2007Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity76 cited
  • 2017SODA: Strategy-Proof Online Double Auction Scheme for Multimicrogrids Bidding71 cited
  • 2013An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging64 cited
  • 2008Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity61 cited
  • 2021Uncertainty in Mechanism Design59 cited
  • 2012Mechanism design without revenue equivalence57 cited
  • 2007Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders51 cited
  • 2006Ex post implementation in environments with private goods50 cited
  • 2010Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions48 cited
  • 2007Weak monotonicity and Bayes–Nash incentive compatibility45 cited