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Top executive pay and firm performance
7 references·0 citing·33 second hop
Top executive pay and firm performance (1992)Top executive pay and firm performanceExecutive Pay and Firm Performance (1990)Executive Pay and Firm Perfor…Corporate Restructuring: Governance and Control Limits of the Internal Capital Market (1990)Corporate Restructuring: Gove…Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes (1989)Chief executive compensation:…Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance (1985)Executive compensation, manag…The conditioning influence of organization size upon managerial practice (1972)The conditioning influence of…Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance (1970)Managerial Pay and Corporate …Organization and environment (1967)Organization and environmentThe Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm (1982)Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers (1984)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The market for corporate control (1983)Executive incentives and the horizon problem (1991)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)POWER IN TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS: DIMENSIONS, MEASUREMENT, AND VALIDATION. (1992)INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION THROUGH START-UP OR ACQUISITION: A LEARNING PERSPECTIVE. (1998)INTERNATIONALIZATION AND FIRM GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES OF CEO COMPENSATION, TOP TEAM COMPOSITION, AND BOARD STRUCTURE. (1998)Properties of organization structure in relation to job attitudes and job behavior. (1965)The Context of Organization Structures (1969)A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations (1970)Organization Structure and Performance: A Critical Review (1980)Task Visibility, Free Riding, and Shirking: Explaining the Effect of Structure and Technology on Employee Behavior (1984)Die meting van die invloed van organisasiegrootte op bruin werkers se houdings en gedrag (1985)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions (1985)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)MODES OF THEORIZING IN STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: TESTS OF UNIVERSALISTIC, CONTINGENCY, AND CONFIGURATIONS. PERFORMANCE PREDICTIONS. (1996)High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms (1999)BUNDLING HUMAN CAPITAL WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSIGNMENT EXPERIENCE ON MULTINATIONAL FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CEO PAY. (2001)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Theoretical Perspectives for Strategic Human Resource Management (1992)STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES. (2000)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking It To Performance (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1967Organization and environment5,206 cited
  • 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance1,209 cited
  • 1989Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes734 cited
  • 1990Executive Pay and Firm Performance352 cited
  • 1990Corporate Restructuring: Governance and Control Limits of the Internal Capital Market336 cited
  • 1970Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance314 cited
  • 1972The conditioning influence of organization size upon managerial practice18 cited

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