Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test

Stefano Gagliarducci · Tommaso Nannicini · Paolo Naticchioni

145 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994–2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin, we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. (JEL D72)

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 145 citations exist upstream.

References

2002Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew 1973The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1981The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics 2003The Economic Effects of Constitutions 1967The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, by Mancur Olson 2007Does Head Start Improve Children's Life Chances? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design 2001The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives

Cited by

2010Moonlighting politicians 2014Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919-1938 2014Sending the Pork Home: Birth Town Bias in Transfers to Italian Municipalities 2016Sending the pork home: Birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities 2013HOW DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AFFECT FISCAL POLICY? EVIDENCE FROM CANTONAL PARLIAMENTS, 1890-2000

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.