The Firm As a Nexus of Treaties.

Abstract

Part 1 Knowledge - its acquisition, sharing and/or asymmetry: the participatory generation of information rents and the theory of the firm, Masahiko Aoki common knowledge and the co-ordination of economic activities, Jacques Cremer profit sharing, information and employment, Matti Pohjola. Part 2 Vertical integration and the strategic management of the enterprise: what is vertical integration?, Michael H.Riordan vertical integration, transaction costs and learning by using, Kurt Lundgren the firm as a nexus of internal and external contracts, Torger Reve. Part 3 Issues of labour organization: the viability of worker ownership - an economic perspective on the political structure of the firm, Henry Hansmann intellectual skill and the role of employees as constituent members of large firms in contemporary Japan, Kazuo Koike the implicit contract for corporate law firm associates - ex post opportunism and ex ante bonding, Robert H.Mooking. Part 4 Finance and the political structure of the firm: capital structure as a mechanism of control - a comparison of financial systems, Erik Berglof long-term contracts in financial markets, Hakan Lindgren the principle of external accountability in competitive markets, Herbert Gintis union militancy and plant designs, Kar Ove Moene can transaction cost economics explain trade associations?, Marc Schneiberg and J.Rogers Hollingsworth.

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