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A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
16 references·0 citing·27 second hop
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer (2015)A simple and approximately optimal mechan…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design (2013)Understanding Incentives: Mec…The menu-size complexity of auctions (2013)The menu-size complexity of a…On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items (2013)On revenue maximization for s…Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mec…Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction (2012)Bayesian optimal auctions via…Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (2012)Approximate Revenue Maximizat…An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)An algorithmic characterizati…The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design (2010)The power of randomness in ba…Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Multi-parameter mechanism des…Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items (2010)Budget constrained auctions w…Simple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Simple versus optimal mechani…Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations (2007)Algorithmic pricing via virtu…The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey…Haggling over substitutes (2003)Haggling over substitutesOptimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Core-selecting package auctions (2007)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (2012)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Combinatorial Auctions (2005)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (2007)Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2017)Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality (2017)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2013)The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values (1989)Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency (1999)Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (2012)Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist (2017)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2005The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction544 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing422 cited
  • 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms317 cited
  • 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations266 cited
  • 2012Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization195 cited
  • 2003Haggling over substitutes175 cited
  • 2012An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms166 cited
  • 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer150 cited
  • 2013On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items130 cited
  • 2012Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items116 cited
  • 2013The menu-size complexity of auctions104 cited
  • 2010The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design102 cited
  • 2010Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items101 cited
  • 2013Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design97 cited
  • 2012Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction

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