A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

Bhaskar Dutta Y · Arunava Sen

138 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economic Studies

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

The main result of this paper is to characterize the class of two-person social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable. The characterization result is used to formulate domain restrictions which allow the construction of non-dictatorial and Pareto-efficient social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 138 citations exist upstream.

References

1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 1992Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms 1990Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization 1978Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria

Cited by

2011Nash implementation with partially honest individuals 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules 1994Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments 1991On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation 1996Nash Implementation of Matching Rules

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.