Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Abstract

The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient. The authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

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