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A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
4 references·5 citing·33 second hop
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation (1991)A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for …Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms (1992)Implementation in Undominated…Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (1990)Nash Implementation: A Full C…The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Implementation of Social …Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria (1978)Construction of Outcome Funct…Nash implementation with partially honest individuals (2011)Nash implementation with part…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …Nash Implementation of Matching Rules (1996)Nash Implementation of Matchi…Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments (1994)Nash implementation through e…On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation (1991)On the necessary and sufficie…The Handbook of experimental economics (1995)A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics (2011)Implementation with evidence (2012)The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule (1991)Implementation Via Nash Equilibria (1992)Aggregation and revelation of preferences (1979)Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points (1979)Non-cooperative implementation of the core (1997)The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (2007)General competitive analysis (1971)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information (1995)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Fifty Years of the Nash Program 1953-2003 (2004)Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (2005)Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (1991)Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (2003)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility809 cited
  • 1992Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms272 cited
  • 1990Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization240 cited
  • 1978Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria83 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Nash implementation with partially honest individuals118 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 1994Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments81 cited
  • 1991On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation76 cited
  • 1996Nash Implementation of Matching Rules76 cited

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