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The relation between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance: A Japanese/American comparison
16 references·3 citing·41 second hop
The relation between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance: A Japanese/American comparison (2007)The relation between changes in CEO compe…Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm (2013)Toward an Economic Model of t…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationChapter 38 Executive compensation (1999)Chapter 38 Executive compensa…Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? (1998)Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bur…Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? (1997)Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bur…Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan (1995)Firm performance, corporate g…Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States (1994)Top Executive Rewards and Fir…Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers (1994)Appointments of outsiders to …The Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different Countries (1993)The Relative Informativeness …Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge (1990)Made in America: Regaining th…Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance (1985)Executive compensation, manag…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium…Aligning CEO compensation with sustainability performance: the role of CEO duality, board size, and compensation committees (2024)Aligning CEO compensation wit…CEO Compensation and Unobserved Firm Performance in Pakistan (2019)CEO Compensation and Unobserv…Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors (2013)Evaluation of board reforms: …The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The market for corporate control (1983)Executive incentives and the horizon problem (1991)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Theory of Social Comparison Processes (1954)Stock options for undiversified executives (2002)Equity Incentives and Earnings Management (2005)Does it really pay to be green? Determinants and consequences of proactive environmental strategies (2010)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (1965)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (2002)Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance (2007)The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting (2010)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices (2011)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 (2003)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1973Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests14,248 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 1999Chapter 38 Executive compensation1,569 cited
  • 1998Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1,373 cited
  • 1997Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1,291 cited
  • 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance1,209 cited
  • 2013Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm987 cited
  • 1994Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers957 cited
  • 1995Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan935 cited
  • 1994Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States860 cited
  • 1990Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge765 cited
  • 1993The Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different Countries

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  • 2024Aligning CEO compensation with sustainability performance: the role of CEO duality, board size, and compensation committees18 cited
  • 2019CEO Compensation and Unobserved Firm Performance in Pakistan16 cited
  • 2013Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors16 cited